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INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment, by its plain terms, prohibits “excessive”
fines and “cruel and unusual punishments.”1  This Article ad-
dresses two aspects of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: classic
conditions of confinement litigation2 and sentencing proportional-
ity litigation,3 both of which spring from judicial interpretation of
the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause.  Although these as-
pects of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence emerged together at the
beginning of the twentieth century, they have increasingly diverged
in the past forty years.  This Article explores whether proportional-
ity litigation has anything to offer prison conditions jurisprudence.
In many ways, this is a strange choice of topics.  Proportionality
litigation in the federal courts has not been particularly successful,
especially in challenging non-capital sentences.4  Further, the criti-
cal scholarly commentary regarding conditions of confinement and
proportionality jurisprudence has focused on tweaking each partic-
ular doctrinal area rather than trying to bridge the differences be-
tween these strands of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.5  For
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. By this, I refer to a range of cases challenging the lived experiences of prison-
ers, including overcrowding, see, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 passim (1981)
(holding that confining two inmates in a single cell does not violate the Eighth
Amendment), excessive force, see, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992),
failure to provide adequate medical care, see, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-
05 (1976), failure to protect from harm, see, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
passim (1994), and deprivation of material needs like food and clean water or air, see,
e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32, 33, 35 (1993) (holding that prisoner could
state cause of action under Eighth Amendment for possible future harm to health
caused by environmental tobacco smoke); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978)
(upholding order to remedy extreme overcrowding, pervasive violence, insufficient
food, and unsanitary conditions).
3. Proportionality litigation does not range as far and wide as conditions of con-
finement litigation.  Under the Supreme Court’s proportionality jurisprudence, crimi-
nal defendants facing a sentence can challenge the term of years of their sentence, see,
e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (rejecting a claim that a forty-year sentence
for possession of nine ounces of marijuana is disproportionate), or the mode of pun-
ishment, see, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (finding that denationalization
was a disproportionate punishment for military desertion).  In recent years, most pro-
portionality litigation has focused on the permissibility of the death penalty for cer-
tain types of crimes, see, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (holding
that the death penalty may not be imposed on a defendant convicted for the rape of a
child under the age of twelve), or for certain categories of defendants, see, e.g., Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty may not be imposed
on a defendant who committed a capital crime when under the age of 18).
4. See infra notes 56-57.
5. See Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman’s Version of Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment: Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches of Women Prisoners, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 85, 105-06 (1995) (arguing that the objective test of Eighth Amendment deliber-
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example, in the area of conditions of confinement litigation, com-
mentators have suggested modifying the “deliberate indifference”
test used to review conditions of confinement challenges,6 or ex-
panding the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement rubric
to embrace new kinds of constitutional claims.7  In proportionality
jurisprudence, scholars have argued that certain punishments
should be considered unconstitutionally disproportionate,8 or that
the Supreme Court’s proportionality analysis itself is flawed.9
Some commentators have also argued for particular ways in which
sentencing decisions could be informed by nontraditional consider-
ations, without changing the contours of proportionality review.10
This Article takes a different tack, albeit with caution.  Comparing
the two doctrines, I draw connections that suggest ways that pro-
ate indifference standard should be gender-specific); Pamela M. Rosenblatt, The Di-
lemma of Overcrowding in the Nation’s Prisons:  What Are Constitutional Conditions
and What Can Be Done? 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 489 (1991) (reviewing possible
traditional challenges to overcrowding); Jeffrey Welty, Restrictions on Prisoners’ Re-
ligious Freedom as Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement:  An Eighth Amend-
ment Argument, 48 DUKE L.J. 601 (1998) (arguing that restrictions on exercise of
religious practices should be analyzed under Eighth Amendment); Russell W. Gray,
Note, Wilson v. Seiter:  Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for
Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339 (1992) (proposing
that ambiguities in deliberate indifference standard be construed to favor prisoners);
Ryan J. Huschka, Comment, Sorry for the Jackass Sentence:  A Critical Analysis of the
Constitutionality of Contemporary Shaming Punishments, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 803
(2006) (arguing that “shaming” punishments are unconstitutional under traditional
Eighth Amendment analysis); Gregory L. Ryan, Comment, Distinguishing Fong Yue
Ting:  Why the Inclusion of Perjury as an Aggravated Felony Subjecting Legal Aliens to
Deportation Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Violates the
Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 989 (1997) (arguing that deportation is a dis-
proportionate penalty for perjury). But see generally Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from
Incarceration:  Why is this Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
781 (1994) (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to criminal statutes that authorize
incarceration for offenses); James E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as the Social
Construction of Reality:  The Supreme Court and Prison Rules, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 161,
193-95 (2000) (arguing for the principle of restorative justice to inform sentencing
decisions); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 780, 840-43 (2006) (proposing greater scrutiny of prosecutors’ role in sentenc-
ing); Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain:  Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitu-
tional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 141-42 (2005) (considering felon
disenfranchisement through proportionality lens).
6. See Krim, supra note 5, at 105-06. See generally Rosenblatt, supra note 5; R
Gray, supra note 5. R
7. See generally Welty, supra note 5. R
8. See generally Huschka, supra note 5; Ryan, supra note 5. R
9. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the
Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007) (criticizing Court’s reliance on in-
ternational consensus as normative authority in proportionality analysis).
10. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 5; Stuntz, supra note 5, at 840-43. See gener- R
ally Colb, supra note 5. R
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portionality analysis could invigorate conditions litigation.  In par-
ticular, I argue that, with respect to twin confounding aspects of
conditions litigation—deference to prison administrators and the
need to establish culpable intent of prison officials—there is some
value added by recognizing and effectuating some of the principles
at stake in proportionality litigation.11
Part I of this Article begins with a discussion of the history of
Eighth Amendment litigation, focusing on state and federal courts
that have addressed both proportionality and conditions chal-
lenges.  Part II examines the current divergence between condi-
tions of confinement and proportionality jurisprudence.  Finally, in
Part III, I suggest how proportionality jurisprudence and condi-
tions of confinement litigation might be reunited, why such a
change might be positive, and what the potential drawbacks may
be.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EIGHTH
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION
A. Early Interpretations of “Cruel and Unusual” Punishments
The purposes of the Framers of the Eighth Amendment, and the
meaning of the “cruel and unusual” punishment clause, have never
been clear.  The Amendment was based on article I, section 9 of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which had adopted the lan-
guage directly from the English Bill of Rights.12  There has been
some disagreement as to whether the Framers intended for the
clause to have the same meaning as the language in the English Bill
of Rights,13 but there was little contemporaneous debate of the
11. Pamela Wilkins has argued that some collateral consequences of conviction,
such as felon disenfranchisement, should be analyzed under the proportionality
framework. See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 141-42.  Collateral consequences of convic- R
tion, like terms of confinement, fit well within the proportionality rubric because they
are defined by statute and often tailored to particular offenses. See generally OFFICE
OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COL-
LATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION (2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/
collateral_consequences.pdf (describing collateral consequences imposed by federal
statutes); Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “the Land of Sec-
ond Chances”:  Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 527 (2006) (discussing statutes imposing collateral consequences on
state offenders).
12. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 n.10 (1983). See generally Anthony F.
Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”:  The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (discussing the origin of Eighth Amendment and Framers’
misinterpretation of the meaning of the English Bill of Rights).
13. Compare Solem, 463 U.S. at 284-85 (arguing that a proportionality principle
was implicit in the Magna Carta and English Bill of Rights), with id. at 313 (Burger,
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clause’s meaning during the Constitutional Convention or during
the debates over ratification of the Bill of Rights.14
For all of the nineteenth century, Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence was underdeveloped in the federal courts.  In large part, this
was because the Supreme Court held that the Amendment applied
only to national, not state, legislation,15 and that various challenges
brought against particular punishments were insubstantial.16  At
most, the early federal cases suggested that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibited “torture . . . and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty,”17 but that judicial deference to legislative
judgments about the appropriateness of particular punishment was
nearly insurmountable.18
The federal government was not alone in prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishments, however.  Many states had adopted the same
language from Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, sometimes prohib-
iting cruel or unusual punishment instead of cruel and unusual
punishment.19  State courts interpreting their state constitution’s
C.J., dissenting) (“The prevailing view up to now has been that the Eighth Amend-
ment reaches only the mode of punishment and not the length of a sentence of impris-
onment.”). See also Granucci, supra note 12, at 844-60 (arguing that the drafters of R
the English Bill of Rights intended to prohibit both excessive and barbarous
punishments).
14. As recounted in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910), some
legislators objected to the vagueness of the “cruel and unusual punishments” lan-
guage, asking whether it would mean that in the future, whipping or dismemberment
would be prohibited for their cruelty.  Little debate ensued in response, and the
clause was “agreed to by a considerable majority.” Id. at 369; see also Granucci, supra
note 12, at 841-42 (discussing debates regarding the Eighth Amendment). R
15. See Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 479-80 (1866); see also
O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448-49
(1890).
16. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878) (finding that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit execution by shooting for first degree murder);
Pervear, 72 U.S. at 480 (“[I]t appears from the record that the fine and punishment in
the case before us was fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of
correction for three months. We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in
this.”).
17. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136; see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (“Punish-
ments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . .”).  Cases in state
courts from the nineteenth century similarly limited state constitutional prohibitions
of cruel and unusual punishment to “barbarous” or “torturous” treatment. See
Weems, 217 U.S. at 375-79 (reviewing state court judgments).
18. See Pervear, 72 U.S. at 480 (“The mode adopted, of prohibiting under penal-
ties the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors, without license, . . . is wholly
within the discretion of State legislatures.”).
19. See, e.g., WYOMING CONST. art. I, § 14.  Very few state courts placed much
reliance on the use of the disjunctive, at least in the nineteenth century. But see Peo-
ple v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Mich. 1992) (relying on disjunctive “or” in Mich-
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analog (and, in some cases, precursor) to the Eighth Amendment
were generally in agreement with their federal cousins.  Thus,
many state courts exhibited nearly absolute deference to legislative
judgments regarding the length of sentences, and only hinted at the
possibility that courts might intervene to find a particular mode of
punishment unconstitutional.20  In so doing, most states agreed that
igan constitution to justify departure from Supreme Court’s interpretation of cruel
and unusual punishment).
20. See State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429, 455-456 (1860) (holding convict leasing not
unconstitutional, because it was not “of a barbarous character, and unknown to the
common law”); Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872) (holding that courts may not
interfere with the judgment of legislature as long as “they do not provide cruel and
unusual punishments, such as disgraced the civilization of former ages, and make one
shudder with horror to read of them, as drawing, quartering, burning, etc.”); People
ex rel. Bradley v. Superintendent, 36 N.E. 76, 79 (Ill. 1894) (“When the legislature has
authorized a designated punishment for a specified crime, it must be regarded that its
action represents the general moral ideas of the people, and the courts will not hold
the punishment so authorized as either cruel and unusual or not proportioned to the
nature of the offense, unless it is a cruel or degrading punishment, not known to the
common law, or is a degrading punishment which had become obsolete in the state
prior to the adoption of its constitution, or is so wholly disproportioned to the offense
committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.”); Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E.
1019, 1021 (Ind. 1893) (suggesting that, when punishment was fixed by statute, the
cruel and unusual punishment clause was all but “obsolete”); State v. White, 25 P. 33,
35 (Kan. 1890) (stating that prohibition “probably . . . relates to the kind of punish-
ment to be inflicted, and not to its duration”); Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264, 267-68
(1883) (upholding whipping as punishment for assault because whipping was a permit-
ted punishment at the Founding); People v. Morris, 45 N.W. 591, 592 (Mich. 1890)
(holding that the state’s “cruel or unusual” punishment clause applies to mode of
punishment, not term of years); State v. Rodman, 59 N.W. 1098, 1100 (Minn. 1894)
(finding that the clause is directed “not so much against the amount or duration of the
punishment, as against the character of it”); State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310, 312 (1883)
(holding that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments “would apply to
such punishments as amount to torture, or such as would shock the mind of every
man possessed of common feeling,” and giving as examples drawing and quartering,
burning at the stake, and dismemberment); Territory v. Ketchum, 65 P. 169, 171 (N.M.
1901) (upholding death sentence for armed robbery and noting that “the discretion of
the legislature in determining the adequacy of the punishment for crime is almost, if
not quite, unlimited”); Garcia v. Territory, 1 N.M. (1 Gild.) 415, 418 (1869) (holding
that penalty of thirty to sixty lashes for stealing cattle is not cruel and unusual because
“cruel . . . was no doubt intended to prohibit a resort to the process of torture”); In re
Bayard, 63 How. Pr. 73, 76 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1881) (interpreting state constitution to
“prohibit[ ] any cruel or degrading punishment not known to the common law, and
probably also, those degrading punishments which in any state had become obsolete
when its existing constitution was adopted, and punishments so disproportioned to
the offense as to shock the sense of the community”); Martin v. Johnston, 33 S.W. 306,
309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (suggesting that cruel and unusual punishment clause ap-
plies to “degrading punishment which in any state had become obsolete before its
existing constitution was adopted”) (quoting THOMAS M. COLLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 402 (De Capo Press 1972) (1868)); Aldridge v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 450 (1824) (finding that banishment and being
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whether a punishment was “cruel” was judged by comparison to
the punishments that were tolerated at common law, while the
word “unusual” referred to how the penalty compared to the prac-
tices in other states or other “civilized” countries.21  Thus, many
state courts upheld punishments that fell within a common under-
standing of “cruel” or “unusual,” but which did not meet the more
specific requirement of having been rejected at common law.  The
New York State Court of Appeals’s resolution of a challenge to
death by electrocution exemplified this approach:
Punishment by death, in a general sense, is cruel; but, as it is
authorized and justified by a law adopted by the people as a
means to the end of the better security of society, it is not cruel,
within the sense and meaning of the Constitution.  The infliction
of the death penalty through a new agency is, of course, unusual;
but, as death is intended as the immediate sequence of the
mechanical application prescribed, it is not unusual in the sense
that some certainly prolonged or torturous procedure would be
understood to be.22
Contrary to the uniform position of the federal courts, however,
states were not unanimous.  A handful of states appeared to con-
sold as a slave was not disproportionate punishment for larceny by a free black, be-
cause cruel and unusual punishment clause of Virginia “is merely applicable to the
modes of punishment”); In re McDonald, 33 P. 18, 21 (Wyo. 1893) (“The constitu-
tional provisions aimed at cruel and unusual punishments were probably intended to
prevent the imposition of obsolete, painful, and degrading punishments, such as the
whipping post, the pillory, and such as making capital a grade of offenses like larceny,
forgery, and the like.”).  Some state courts simply could not decide whether the prohi-
bition offered any role for judicial intervention. See State v. Lasater, 68 Tenn. 584,
587 (1877) (“Whether the courts have the power to annul the acts of the Legislature
on this ground, or whether the provision is simply directed to the Legislature to gov-
ern them in the passage of laws, and to the courts in inflicting punishment in cases
where the punishment is within the discretion of the courts, we need not now
determine.”).
21. See Hobbs, 32 N.E. at 1021 (interpreting “cruel” to prohibit punishment “such
as that inflicted at the whipping post, in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, etc.” and “unusual” to refer to “that class of punishments which never
existed in the state” or which public opinion had rejected); In re Tutt, 41 P. 957, 958
(Kan. 1895) (finding a penalty may be “severe,” but still consititutional if it is “of the
kind usually inflicted on offenders”); White, 25 P. at 35  (imprisonment at hard labor
is not unconstitutional because it “is a kind of punishment which has been resorted to
ever since Kansas has had any existence, and is a kind of punishment common in all
civilized countries”); People v. Wilkinson, 2 Utah 158, 164 (1877) (finding that execu-
tion by firing squad is constitutional because it is the method used in the army, “other
civilized countries,” and the criminals’ preferred mode of death, as compared to hang-
ing or beheading); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 694, 701 (1828) (up-
holding a statute that permitted courts to punish gambling with whipping to the point
of death because, while perhaps “odious,” it “cannot be said to be unusual”).
22. People v. Kemmler, 24 N.E. 9, 11 (N.Y. 1890).
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cede that excessive punishments, even if expressed in terms of
years, could violate the constitutional prohibition.23  Further, a sur-
prising number of state courts struck down sentences, expressed
both as modes of punishment and terms of years in prison, for be-
ing excessive.  In some of these cases, the punishment at issue was
akin to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.24  But in
other cases the term of imprisonment was much less,25 and the
modes of punishment found unconstitutional ranged from lashes,
the ducking stool, and seizure of property.26
23. See, e.g., Cardillo v. People, 58 P. 678, 680-81 (Colo. 1899) (holding that a
penalty must be “clearly excessive” to violate constitution); Harper v. Common-
wealth, 19 S.W. 737, 738 (Ky. 1892) (court can only find a punishment cruel and unu-
sual where “it clearly manifestly so appears,” and punishing gambling with
imprisonment does not offend this principle); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E.
874, 875 (Mass. 1899) (conceding the “possib[ility] that imprisonment in the state
prison for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to
constitute a cruel and unusual punishment”); State v. Becker, 51 N.W. 1018,
1022 (S.D. 1892) (“great latitude” must be given to the legislature, and the court
should intervene “only when the punishment is so excessive or so cruel as to meet the
disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally”).
24. See Jones v. Territory, 43 P. 1072, 1074 (Okla. 1896) (suggesting in dicta that
sentence of fifty years for manslaughter might be “cruel and inhuman” if it exceeded
“the probable lifetime of the person convicted”); State v. Ross, 104 P. 596, 604-05 (Or.
1909) (holding that life imprisonment for nonpayment of fine arising from larceny
conviction is cruel and unusual punishment and that court may declare sentence ex-
cessive “even though within the maximum of the statute”).
25. See State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 19 So. 457, 459 (La. 1896) (finding that
imprisonment for 2,160 days for being in default of paying fines of $270 violated the
constitution where the court imposed a sentence for seventy-two distinct offenses of
one city ordinance); State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423, 429 (1878) (finding sentence of five
years imprisonment for assault and battery of defendant’s wife to be unconstitutional
under state law, and noting that the power to find a sentence unconstitutional “is
there, not so much to draw a fine line close up to which Judges may come, but as a
‘warning’ to keep them clear away from it.”); see also Byrnes v. People, 37 Mich. 515,
517 (1877) (suggesting that a five year sentence for petit larceny is excessive); Johnson
v. Waukesha County, 25 N.W. 7, 9 (Wis. 1885) (suggesting in dicta that an anti-tramp
law could be unconstitutional because it makes tramping a felony simply by virtue of
the location of the crime, and because the punishment amounts to fifteen days in jail
with a diet of bread and water alone).
26. See Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385 (1863) (finding a statute providing
for seizure of property and slaves of persons engaging in rebellion during Civil War
was unconstitutional); Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 70, 74 (1820) (finding
a sentence of thirty lashes unconstitutional when applied as a punishment to a “free
person of color” who attempts to defend himself against assault by a white person);
James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 230-34 (Pa. 1825) (finding the duck-
ing stool was unconstitutional for punishment of a “common scold”); cf. Thomas v.
Kinkead, 18 S.W. 854, 856 (Ark. 1892) (holding that a police officer may not use
deadly force to effectuate arrest of misdemeanant because it would be unconstitu-
tional to punish misdemeanor with death penalty).
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Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, challenges to punish-
ments based on the Eighth Amendment, or a state constitutional
analog, were rarely successful, in large part because of the defer-
ence afforded legislatures to make judgments regarding the appro-
priateness of particular punishments.  To the extent that any
doctrine had developed to evaluate the constitutionality of particu-
lar punishments, several sources of authority, none dispositive, had
emerged, including the practices of the Framers, their contempo-
raries, other states, and other “civilized” nations, as well as the ex-
tent to which a particular punishment was repugnant to popular
conceptions of justice.
At the time that a doctrine of excessiveness or proportionality
was developing in the area of just punishment, little to no constitu-
tional challenges had been brought to the conditions under which
convicted individuals were imprisoned.  This should not be surpris-
ing; during the nineteenth century, even as courts considered con-
stitutional challenges to the length of imprisonment, the conditions
experienced therein were considered out of bounds.  Prisoners
were considered to be “slaves of the State,”27 and any rights they
retained to decent treatment while incarcerated came from state
and local laws, not the Constitution.28
B. Modern Interpretations of “Cruel and
Unusual” Punishments
Joining the minority of state supreme courts which had struck
down sentences for excessiveness, the United States Supreme
Court advanced a more rigorous interpretation of the Constitu-
27. Most commentators cite Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 795-
96 (1871), for this language, even though Ruffin concerns a right to a jury trial for a
prisoner who was accused of killing a guard during an escape attempt:
A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement in
the penitentiary instead of with death, is subject while undergoing that pun-
ishment, to all the laws which the Legislature in its wisdom may enact for the
government of that institution and the control of its inmates.  For the time
being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he is in a state of penal
servitude to the State.  He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only for-
feited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its
humanity accords to him.  He is for the time being the slave of the State.  He
is civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a
dead man.
Id.
28. See, e.g., Doster v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. 233, 234 (1884) (finding a municipal-
ity was not liable for a tort committed by inmate or guard upon a prisoner); Ex parte
Jenkins, 58 N.E. 560, 561-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1900) (finding a sheriff owes a duty of care
to preserve the life and health of prisoners).
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tion’s cruel and unusual punishment clause in its 1910 decision in
Weems v. United States.29  In Weems, the Court for the first time
struck down as excessive a sentence imposed by a court in the Phil-
ippines for falsifying a public and official document.30  The trial
court had sentenced the defendant, a Coast Guard official, to fif-
teen years imprisonment, as well as to an additional punishment
known as cadena temporal.31  Those individuals sentenced to
cadena temporal were required, pursuant to statute, to engage in
“hard labor,”32 were chained at the ankle and wrist at all times, and
were deprived of certain rights and privileges even after release
from prison.33  Because the Court viewed the sentence as excessive,
especially compared to sentences for more serious crimes, it found
that the statute fixing the sentence reflected “more than different
exercises of legislative judgment” and that it instead imposed cruel
and unusual punishment under the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment.34  The Court notably declined to consider the fixed imprison-
ment term of the sentence separately from the conditions of
confinement imposed by the cadena temporal sentence, because
they had been imposed pursuant to statute, and therefore had to be
considered jointly as punishment.35
Although Weems embraced a substantively novel approach to
Eighth Amendment questions by breaking with the traditional
view that it only prohibited punishments deemed “barbarous” by
29. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
30. Id. at 381-82.  Because the case arose out of the Philippines, which contained a
cruel and unusual punishment clause identical to the Eighth Amendment, the issue of
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment against the States did not arise.
31. Id. at 362-64.  The punishment originated in Spain, and literally means “tem-
porary chain.” See id. at 363.
32. The requirement that prisoners engage in “hard labor” originated in England
in the mid-1500s and came into vogue in the United States at the beginning of the
eighteenth century on the theory that work was intimately connected to successful
rehabilitation. See David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 83-85 (1998).  There also were overlapping economic
interests in putting convicts to work, particularly as a substitute for slave labor after
the Civil War. See Alexis M. Durham III, Lease System, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMER-
ICAN PRISONS 277, 281 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams eds., 1996).
33. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364-66.  The additional punishment associated with cadena
temporal included the deprivation of parental rights, the right to dispose of property
through a will, the obligation to give authorities notice of any change in domicile, and
the disqualification to hold public office or to vote. Id. at 364-65.  As the Supreme
Court noted, the only punishments more severe than cadena temporal were death or
cadena perpetua. Id. at 363-64.
34. Id. at 380-81 (comparing punishment to punishment for crimes such as homi-
cide, conspiracy, and forgery).
35. Id. at 381.
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the Framers,36 after Weems, the Supreme Court added little to
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for some years.  This is not to
say that, during this time, no cases offered interpretations of the
federal and state prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishments.
State and lower federal courts applied Weems in numerous novel
ways, from ordering that a prisoner be set free rather than be re-
turned to experience cruel and unusual punishment in Georgia’s
prison system;37 finding vasectomy to be an excessive punishment
36. There are many notable aspects to the Weems decision that are beyond the
scope of this Article, but the Court’s embrace of a “living constitution” theory of the
Eighth Amendment stands out.  Indeed, in language that is evocative of much later
Warren Court precedents, the Weems Court stated:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be neces-
sarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.  Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth.  This is peculiarly true of constitutions.  They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.
Id. at 373.
37. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1949) (ordering that a prisoner
be released because evidence indicated that Georgia prison officials “treat chain gang
prisoners with persistent and deliberate brutality” and that “the State of Georgia has
failed signally in its duty as one of the sovereign States of the United States to treat a
convict with decency and humanity.”); Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D.N.J.
1949) (following Johnson in a case involving a fifteen-year-old escapee from Georgia
who had been sentenced to ten years imprisonment).  The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded Johnson because the lower court had not required that the petitioner
first exhaust his state law remedies prior to filing his federal habeas petition.  Dye v.
Johnson, 338 U.S. 864, 864 (1949) (reversing in light of Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114
(1944)).  Nonetheless, Johnson’s substantive holding was followed by a district court
in California facing substantially the same question. In re Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp.
943, 951-54 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (relying on Johnson and holding that exhaustion of state
law remedies in California was sufficient), rev’d sub nom. Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188
F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding that petitioner need have exhausted state law
remedies in Georgia and California).  Other courts hesitated to find otherwise “inex-
cusable and shocking” conditions of confinement to violate the Eighth Amendment,
precisely because of the concern that the ramification of doing so would result in the
release of all prisoners held within the confines of the particular institution. See Ex
parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 289-90 (D. Alaska 1951); see also Ex parte Ellis, 91 P.
81, 83 (Kan. 1907) (“It must be obvious, however, that we cannot order the petitioner
released on account of the condition of the jail. To do so would require us on similar
applications to order the release of all prisoners confined there.”); cf. Ex parte Terrill,
287 P. 753, 755 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930) (declining to entertain habeas petition alleg-
ing conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment where prison had not first
attempted to pursue state law remedies).  The Supreme Court, while not passing on
the question of whether release on a habeas petition was a proper remedy for exper-
iencing cruel and unusual punishment, eventually made clear that state law remedies
must be pursued in the state in which the sentence was carried out, and not in the
asylum state. See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1952).
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for rapists38 or recidivist felons;39 holding life imprisonment to be a
disproportionate punishment for “committing lewd and lascivious
acts upon and with the body of a female child under the age of
sixteen years”40 or for assault with intent to commit rape;41 and
finding a sentence of four years for assault with a deadly weapon to
be excessive.42
The Supreme Court, however, did not address a substantive
Eighth Amendment claim until 1958, in Trop v. Dulles,43 almost
fifty years after Weems.  In Trop, the Supreme Court again struck
down a punishment as “cruel and unusual.”  The statute that was
invalidated authorized federal courts to impose denationalization
as a punishment for military desertion, a penalty that the Court
found to be repugnant to Eighth Amendment principles and inter-
national law—and what a plurality of the Court referred to as
“evolving standards of decency.”44  This rubric, which self-con-
sciously allowed for interpretive change over time, would come to
be the centerpiece of proportionality analysis.
In some respects, the dearth of Eighth Amendment interpreta-
tion from Weems to Trop can be attributed to the Court’s selective
incorporation doctrine, under which the Eighth Amendment was
not applied to the states until 1962.45  Soon after the Eighth
Amendment’s incorporation, challenges were brought against capi-
tal punishment in particular, with brief initial success.46  In these
38. See Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 691 (D. Nev. 1918).
39. See Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417-19 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (three-judge panel),
vacated as moot, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
40. See State v. Evans, 245 P.2d 788, 793-94 (Idaho 1952) (construing a maximum
sentence to mean less than life in order to save constitutionality of statute).
41. See Cannon v. Gladden, 281 P.2d 233 (Or. 1955) (en banc).
42. See State v. Smith, 93 S.E. 910 (N.C. 1917).  The prospect of lengthy detention
for crimes of poverty, such as non-willful failure to comply with an order to pay ali-
mony, also raised the ire of local judges. E.g., Politano v. Politano, 262 N.Y.S. 802
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933).
43. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
44. Id. at 101 (plurality opinion).
45. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding the Eighth
Amendment was violated by a statute that made it a criminal offense for a person to
be addicted to narcotics). Robinson’s substantive holding was limited in Powell v.
Texas, which held that punishing a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. See 392 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1968).
46. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that capital
punishment decisions could not be left to unconfined discretion of the judge or jury).
After Furman, most states that contemplated imposing capital punishment on crimi-
nal defendants responded by passing statutes purporting to cabin that discretion.
These statutes were, with some exceptions, upheld shortly after Furman. See, e.g.,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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early challenges, Weems and its more recent progeny, Trop, were
treated as the definitive precedent for understanding the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment.47
This treatment continued in Estelle v. Gamble,48 the first modern
case to challenge prison conditions alone, separate and apart from
a criminal sentence.  Like the cases resolving challenges to capital
punishment, Estelle looked to both Weems and Trop to establish
that the Eighth Amendment applied to more than “physically bar-
barous punishments,” but also to punishments incompatible with
“evolving standards of decency” or involving the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.”49  With these standards in mind, the Es-
telle Court held that the government had some obligation to pro-
vide medical care to prisoners, because the absence of such care
could “result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would
serve any penological purpose.”50  Such deprivations of medical
care that amounted to “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs” were equivalent, in the Court’s view, to unnecessary inflic-
tion of pain.51
Estelle is significant in one way that is familiar to the participants
in this conference—it explicitly held that conditions of confinement
imposed by prison officials rather than by statute can constitute
“punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.52  At the same time,
however, Estelle distinguished conditions of confinement claims
from claims that a punishment was disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment.53  Thus, Estelle expanded the ability of prison
advocates to use Eighth Amendment standards to challenge partic-
47. E.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 241-42, 264-69, 271-72 (Douglas, J., concurring) (re-
lying on Weems and Trop).
48. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
49. Id. at 102-03 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
50. Id. at 103.
51. Id. at 104.
52. It did so with little substantive analysis, an aspect of Estelle which has been
criticized by Justices Scalia and Thomas, who argue that conditions of confinement
imposed by prison officials should never be considered “punishment” for Eighth
Amendment purposes. E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).  In so doing, however, these dissenters have described Weems as a case
about a “sentence imposed for the crime of falsifying a document,” without adverting
to that aspect of Weems which addressed the conditions of confinement imposed
under cadena temporal. Id. at 41 n.1.  Notably, pre-Estelle state and federal court
cases that had addressed challenges to conditions of confinement had assumed that
barbaric conditions could constitute “punishment” without much analysis, perhaps
because they were brought as habeas actions rather than section 1983 claims. See
supra notes 24-26, 37-42 and accompanying text. R
53. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 n.7.
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ular conditions of confinement in absolute terms—that is, to con-
demn particular conditions for all time and for any class of
prisoner.  Yet it also drew a line that severed sentences—whether
terms of years or capital punishment—from conditions of confine-
ment for the purpose of Eighth Amendment analysis, a line that
had been obscured in Weems and post-Weems lower court cases.
This line was maintained and expanded by the post-Estelle deci-
sions, both in the area of proportionality challenges and in condi-
tions of confinement litigation.  Thus, proportionality
jurisprudence has been limited to cases involving challenges to
death sentences54 or fixed periods of imprisonment,55 while Es-
telle’s formulation has been applied to conditions of confinement
claims alleging, for example, overcrowding56 or excessive force.57
54. For instance, sentencing regimes that mandate the death penalty upon convic-
tion, without qualification, have been declared unconstitutional. See Roberts v. Loui-
siana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); cf.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (mitigating factors must be given individualized
consideration prior to imposition of death penalty).  Similarly, the Court has declared
unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty for crimes that do not involve the
death of another. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (child rape);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rape of an adult woman).  The Court has also
declared that the states may be prohibited from executing particular categories of
defendants. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the death sen-
tence for those who commit crimes under the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (death sentence for the mentally retarded is unconstitutional);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (prohibiting the death sentence for
those who commit crimes under the age of sixteen).  The Court has also reviewed
challenges to executions carried out by particular means. E.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S.
Ct. 1520 (2008) (finding a death sentence carried out pursuant to a three-drug lethal
injection was not per se unconstitutional); Louisana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (plurality opinion) (rejecting claim that an attempt to execute
someone by electrocution after the first attempt failed was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment).
55. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding California’s “three-
strikes” law); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding a sentence of life
without parole for a first-time offender who was found guilty of possession of 650
grams of cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (finding the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibited imposition of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a
non-violent recidivist whose crimes were minor); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982)
(per curiam) (upholding a sentence of forty years for possession with intent to dis-
tribute nine ounces of marijuana); Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding
a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment under a Texas recidivist statute).
56. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981).  Interestingly, Rhodes
hinted at a proportionality standard for prison conditions, stating that “[c]onditions
must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.” Id. at
347.  But Rhodes then quickly suggested that, unless conditions of confinement meet
the standard under the “wanton and unnecessary” prong, they will not be considered
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because “they are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id.
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The standard for conditions of confinement is Estelle’s “deliberate
indifference” standard, which requires that a prisoner show that
the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind where
the “pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the
statute or the sentencing judge . . . .”58  The standard for propor-
tionality analysis has focused on the gross proportionality of
sentences, in which the severity of a sentence is compared to the
seriousness of the offender’s crime.59  Many factors contribute to
the proportionality analysis, including how the punishment fits with
different penological theories, the types of punishment meted out
by sovereign states and even internationally, and the court’s own
subjective evaluation of proportionality.60  In all of these and other
cases, Estelle’s conditions of confinement standard is treated dis-
tinctly from Weems’ proportionality analysis.61
Thus, modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is composed of
several distinct strands, two of which are relevant to this paper.
First, proportionality challenges to sentences of death or a term of
years of imprisonment are brought by criminal defendants who al-
lege that a sentence is excessive in relation to the seriousness of a
57. For use of force cases, a plaintiff must show that an official acted “maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”  Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 320-21 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the standard for use
of force during prison riots); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992)
(extending the Whitley standard to all allegations of excessive force).
58. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (applying subjective state of mind requirement to review of smok-
ing policy in prison).
59. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
60. A good example of the intersection of each of these factors is presented by
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which held that the death penalty was dispro-
portionate punishment for those who committed a death-eligible crime while under
the age of eighteen years old.
61. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (citing Weems as an
example of a basic proportionality principle); Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (relying on
Weems as an example of a case protecting against “excessive sanctions”); Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003) (citing Weems as an example of a case applying
the proportionality principle); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 302, 311 (2002) (relying on
Weems for the proportionality principle in a death sentence case); Wilson, 501 U.S. at
307 (White, J., concurring); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (relying on
Weems for the proportionality principle in a death penalty case); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (describing Weems as proportionality decision and Estelle as a
decision implicating the concepts of “dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and de-
cency”).  Only one case, which involved a challenge to corporal punishment in public
schools, treated Estelle, Trop, and Weems as cases all involving punishment in general.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1977).
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criminal offense.62  Second, challenges to particular conditions of
confinement are judged by whether the conditions are reasonably
connected to legitimate penological interests or, instead, inflict un-
necessary pain and suffering.63  Proportionality analysis asks
whether the sentence imposed on a defendant is a proper “fit” for
the offense of conviction—by definition, some sentences will be
constitutional as applied to one set of defendants, but prohibited as
applied to a different set of defendants.  Conditions of confinement
analysis, in contrast, asks whether the conditions violate minimum
standards of decency, without reference to the crime of convic-
tion—as such, particular conditions of confinement will be permit-
ted or prohibited on an absolute, all-or-nothing basis.
II. THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF PROPORTIONALITY
AND CONDITIONS LITIGATION
In Part I, I sought to describe the historical trend in Eighth
Amendment litigation.  I first traced the evolution of the doctrine
to Weems, which did not distinguish between the conditions of con-
finement experienced by prisoners and the length of their sentence.
I then described the modern understanding that uses a proportion-
ality analysis to review sentences of death or of a fixed term of
years, and conditions of confinement analysis to consider the lived
experience of prisoners.  Part II demonstrates the ways in which
this division has influenced the principles and practices of condi-
tions and proportionality litigation.
62. E.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661 (finding the death penalty may not be im-
posed on a defendant convicted of the rape of a child under the age of twelve);
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (noting that the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle applies to both
capital and noncapital sentences).  In recent years, most proportionality litigation has
focused on the permissibility of the death penalty for certain types of crimes, or for
certain categories of defendants. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (holding that the death
penalty may not be imposed on a defendant who committed a capital crime when
under the age of eighteen).  Challenges to the death penalty may also be brought
based on the arbitrariness of a capital punishment regime, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), or because the goals of capital punishment are inconsistent with exe-
cuting offenders who share particular characteristics, such as the mentally retarded.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.  These kinds of challenges rely, in many ways, on the
factors that inform proportionality analysis, but they are not conceived of as chal-
lenges to the excessiveness of a particular sentence.
63. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. R
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A. The Dissonant Elements of Modern Proportionality and
Conditions of Confinement Jurisprudence
Both conditions of confinement and proportionality litigation
challenge “punishments” as being inconsistent with Eighth
Amendment standards.  And the general principles of certain
cases—Weems and Trop among them—inform both areas of juris-
prudence.  Nonetheless, depending on what kind of challenge is
before them, courts use vastly different tools to obtain an answer
to the same question: is a particular punishment “cruel and unu-
sual”?  In proportionality litigation, the fundamental question is
the fit between a particular sentence, expressed as a prison term or
as a mode of punishment, and the particular crime committed by a
prisoner.  Evaluating that fit involves both subjective and objective
elements.  Subjectively, courts ask whether the punishment ap-
pears “grossly disproportionate” to the crime, based on the seri-
ousness of the crime and the extent to which the punishment meets
rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals.64  Objectively,
courts review several indicia of consensus as to the justness of a
particular punishment in relation to a particular crime.  Although
the precise indicators of consensus are contested, courts have tradi-
tionally looked to the following factors:  the punishment for more
and less serious crimes within the sentencing jurisdiction (in-
trajurisdictional comparison); the punishment for comparable
crimes in other states (interjurisdictional comparison); the punish-
ment dispensed for comparable crimes in other countries; and pub-
lic opinion as measured by polling data, jury verdicts, and
specialized expertise.65
Conditions of confinement litigation also requires consideration
of subjective and objective elements, but of an entirely different
sort than proportionality cases.  Subjectively, a plaintiff seeking to
challenge particular prison conditions must show that the proper
defendant had a particular state of mind with respect to those con-
ditions.66  The subjective state of mind that must be proved ranges
from deliberate indifference, which is something akin to criminal
recklessness, to intentionality.67  Objectively, the prisoner must
64. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. R
65. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-77 (discussing international law); Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 291-92 (1983) (discussing intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional com-
parisons); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788 (discussing importance of jury verdicts to propor-
tionality inquiry).
66. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299.
67. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (requiring that a plaintiff show
deliberate indifference when the allegation is that prison officials failed to protect a
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also show that the conditions of confinement she has experienced
constitute an “extreme” deprivation of life’s basic necessities, in-
cluding adequate medical care, food, shelter, or safety.68  Even in-
tentional uses of force, if they inflict “de minimis” injury, do not
amount to violations of the Eighth Amendment.69
One of the most glaring differences between proportionality and
conditions of confinement analysis is the relevance of state of
mind.  In proportionality litigation, there is no explicit requirement
that a prisoner show that any particular official intended to subject
the prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment.  The only question is
whether the punishment offends evolving standards of decency, as
measured by objective and subjective measures of proportionality.
It may be that this is because proportionality challenges are typi-
cally brought against punishment that is imposed by legislation,
and there can be no question that the legislature intended to pass
whatever measures the statute provides for the punishment.70  It
might make sense to treat conditions of confinement as non-puni-
tive where the condition is inflicted through unintentional or even
negligent conduct, whereas the intentionality of legislatures passing
criminal statutes is obvious.  This explanation, however, would also
apply to explicit policies or regulations adopted by prison adminis-
trators, in which the need to prove intent could also be said to be
superfluous.  An alternative explanation may lie in the different
forms these challenges take.  Proportionality challenges are typi-
cally brought as part of a direct appeal of a conviction and sen-
tence, or through habeas challenges.  In those circumstances,
typically the state is defending the punishment, and it makes little
sense to argue about the state of mind of a sovereign entity.  Con-
ditions of confinement challenges, on the other hand, are now
brought almost exclusively pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which has
been interpreted to only permit actions against individuals and mu-
prisoner from assault by other detainees); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)
(finding that excessive force is only actionable under the Eighth Amendment if an
official had used force “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm and not for a legit-
imate penological reason).
68. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9.
69. Id. at 9-10.
70. This explanation may pose an interpretive difficulty for those judges who do
not believe that legislative intent is ascertainable.
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nicipalities, and not a state qua state.71  A particular state of mind
can be attributed to individuals, at the very least.72
The thread of deference that runs through both conditions of
confinement and proportionality jurisprudence also rests on differ-
ent assumptions in each category of cases.  In proportionality litiga-
tion, deference is considered essential to ceding to the legislature,
as a majoritarian institution, the primary responsibility of judging
the seriousness of particular crimes.  After all, if courts are gener-
ally disempowered from creating common law crimes because of
separation of powers concerns,73 it follows that legislatures should
be given as much leeway to punish particular crimes as they are
given to define them.  The deference that pervades conditions of
confinement litigation, in contrast, is grounded not in majoritarian
principles, but in a discourse that relies heavily on agency “exper-
tise.”  On this account, the daily decisions necessary to running a
prison are better left to prison administrators than to state or fed-
eral judges.
The differences outlined here are not exhaustive.  But they show
that the answer to the question “what is a ‘cruel and unusual’ pun-
ishment?” depends largely on where, why, and by whom the ques-
tion is being asked.  Part II.B next addresses whether facially
similar questions may be answered differently under either
analysis.
B. The Practical Ramifications of the Dissonant Elements of
Conditions and Proportionality Litigation
It may, at first glance, appear strange to suggest that conditions
of confinement litigation could benefit from an incorporation of
proportionality analysis.  After all, it would seem that conditions of
71. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989).  Of course, the fiction in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows prisoners to seek injunctive relief against the state
by permitting suit against a state actor in his official capacity, Will, 491 U.S. at 7 n.10,
but that fiction still assumes that an individual person is being sued, and not an entity
that lacks the ability to have a state of mind.
72. As the Court has implicitly recognized, it may be harder to coherently speak
of the state of mind of a municipality. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 267 (1981) (“A municipality, however, can have no malice independent of the
malice of its officials.”).
73. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).  State courts
appear to exercise more discretion in interpreting criminal statutes in light of the com-
mon law. See Keith Hampton, Case Note, Criminal Law-Mail Fraud-Mail Fraud Stat-
ute Restricted to the Protection of Property Rights and Does not Extend to the
Protection of the Intangible Right to Honest and Impartial State Government, 19 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1115, 1121 n.21 (1988).
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confinement litigation has been more friendly to advocates of pris-
oners, especially compared to proportionality litigation that has
challenged non-capital sentences.  While not uniformly successful,
conditions of confinement litigation has alleviated some of the
most extreme overcrowding and medical inadequacies,74 assisted in
the development of correctional norms and standards,75 and con-
tributed to the internalization of these norms through a profes-
sional corrections staff.76  Conditions of confinement litigation has
been successful for numerous reasons, including its potential to ex-
pose officials to negative publicity, the increased funding that nor-
mally accompanies court orders in institutional reform litigation,
and the availability of highly competent counsel.77
There are limits to conditions of confinement litigation, however,
in large part because of the hesitance of courts to interpret the
Eighth Amendment to provide more than prisoners’ basic needs.78
Even after the explosion of prisoners’ rights litigation in the 1970s
and 1980s, when federal courts were accused of taking too in-
terventionist a stance with respect to state prisons, prison condi-
tions were far from optimal.79  For example, in 1993, forty states,
74. See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 639, 670-73 & nn.135-46 (1993) [hereinafter Sturm, Legacy] (collecting
cases); see also Morales Feliciano v. Rosello´ Gonza´lez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 153 (D.P.R.
1998) (addressing inadequate medical care).
75. Sturm, Legacy, supra note 74, at 662-63. R
76. Id. at 663-66.
77. Id. at 681-83.  As an example of the threat with which prison administrators
viewed public visibility, Human Rights Watch has always experienced significantly
more difficulty obtaining access to prisons in the United States as compared with
other countries. Id. at 692.
78. Id. at 675 (“Courts have not interpreted the Eighth Amendment to invalidate
outdated institutions that warehouse inmates, even if levels of violence are predict-
ably higher in those institutions, as long as inmates receive the basic necessities of
life.”)
79. See, e.g., id. at 687-88 nn.216-19 (citing cases throughout the country from the
1980s and 1990s in which prison officials failed to respond to a tuberculosis outbreak,
were in contempt for noncompliance with consent decrees, correctional institutions
were condemned as unsanitary and dangerous, food services were determined to pre-
sent a health risk, medical services were found inadequate, psychiatric services were
deemed nonexistent, heating and cooling equipment were found insufficient, and the
safety of inmates was considered threatened by recurrent violence).  Recently, prisons
have faced potentially deadly outbreaks of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(“MRSA”), due in part to unsanitary conditions. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control
and Prevention, Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Infections in Correctional
Facilities—Georgia, California, and Texas, 2001-2003, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP., Oct. 17 2003,  http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5241a4.
htm (reporting investigations of transmission among Georgia, California, and Texas
prisoners); Kelly Virella, Releasing the Disease, CHI. READER, Oct. 11, 2007, http://
www.chicagoreader.com/features/stories/releasingthedisease/ (reporting on MRSA
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the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were
under court supervision for overcrowding or other conditions of
confinement; one quarter of all jails in the United States were su-
pervised for crowding issues in 1990; and thirty percent of jails
were under court order related to conditions of confinement.80  By
1995, there were thirty-three prison systems under court supervi-
sion regarding overcrowding or general prison conditions, and even
prison systems that were not under court order were “significantly
overcrowded.”81
In addition, many barriers to litigating prison conditions cases
have sprung up in the last decade.  So, while arguments have been
made in favor of judicial involvement in reforming prisons,82 those
arguments appear to have less force in the face of the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act,83 which limits the power of federal courts to
enter remedial orders.  The result has been a turn to individual
damages actions and a decline in broad institutional reform litiga-
tion in favor of more precise and tailored conditions litigation.84
outbreak in Cook County Jail); MRSA Outbreak Reported in State Prisons, http://
www.nbc30.com/health/17432044/detail.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (reporting
dozens of prisoners infected with MRSA in Connecticut State prisons); Correc-
tions.com, Super-Scary Superbugs, http://www.corrections.com/news/article/17883
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (reporting an outbreak of MRSA in a Tulsa, Oklahoma
jail).
80. Sturm, Legacy, supra note 74, at 641-42.  As of 1993, the problems in jails had R
not received as much attention as the problems in prisons, even though jails probably
had more serious problems. Id. at 697-98.
81. Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding:  Harmful Psychological
Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
265, 268 (2006) (quoting figures from ACLU’s National Prison Project).
82. E.g., Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma:  Strategies of Judicial In-
tervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 846-47 (1990) (arguing that courts are
well-positioned to be involved in significant intervention because they are indepen-
dent from political influences—an “external source of normative authority”—with
power to distribute rewards and penalties to prison officials, with the potential to
expose prison systems to “public scrutiny,” and the possibility of giving well-inten-
tioned, reform-minded participants cover to make change).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000).  State analogs to the federal Prison Litigation Reform
Act have been passed as well. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-106-201 to -204
(2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1181-1191 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.5501-
.5531 (2000); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 57, § 566.4 (West 2004).
84. See generally Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time:  A Case
Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006).  Some of the
decline may be attributable to greater judicial deference to prison administrators, the
inculcation of the norms established in the first wave of litigation, and the need to
devote resources to monitoring the litigation that has been successful to date.  This is
not to say that institutional reform litigation is no longer effective—litigators have
had more success, for instance, challenging inadequate medical and psychiatric care in
recent years, from wholesale challenges in California, see, e.g., Plata v. Schwarzeneg-
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With the relatively limited recent success of prison conditions liti-
gation, it is worth asking whether there are alternative ways to ob-
tain relief for prisoners who continue to experience debilitating
conditions of confinement.
For instance, imagine two prisoners who are subjected to physi-
cal abuse by prison officials.  One of these prisoners resides in a
state where the battery85 is mandated by statute as part of the crim-
inal sentence.86  The second prisoner resides in a different state,
where the mistreatment is at the hands of a correction officer who
has no legitimate reason for striking the prisoner.  The first pris-
oner would likely succeed in claiming that the statute mandating
the battery is unconstitutional under a traditional proportionality
analysis.87  A court would first ask whether the use of physical
force is “grossly disproportionate” to the prisoner’s crime, and
then conduct an inter- and intrajurisdictional analysis to determine
whether evolving standards of decency reflect a consensus that cor-
poral punishment for criminal conduct is disproportionate punish-
ment.  In addition, the court would likely ask whether there is any
penological purpose that is served by using physical assault to pun-
ish crime.  At least as things currently stand, with no state authoriz-
ing the use of corporal punishment, it would be difficult to avoid
the conclusion that a statute such as this is unconstitutional.
The prisoner challenging the abuse meted out by the corrections
officer, on the other hand, has a more difficult task.  Putting aside
the need to establish that the corrections officer used the force “sa-
distically and maliciously,” which we may presume from the fact
that there was no legitimate security or disciplinary reason for us-
ing the force, the prisoner would still have to establish more than a
“de minimis” harm.88  This is not a trivial requirement, and has led
ger, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2008), to specific challenges to the provision of
Hepatitis C vaccine in Oregon, see, e.g., Anstett v. Oregon, No. 3:01-CV-01619 (D.
Or. dismissed June 28, 2007), and New York, see, e.g., Hilton v. Wright, 235 F.R.D. 40
(N.D.N.Y. 2006).
85. By “battery,” I refer to the classic definition from tort law:  nonconsented
touching.
86. While it may be difficult today to imagine such a statute, it was not unusual for
certain crimes to be punished by whipping or other physical force in the nineteenth
century. See supra note 26. R
87. E.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding use of “the
strap” unconstitutional in Arkansas prisons).
88. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992).  Although an injury can be
either psychological or physical, to be actionable under the Eighth Amendment, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes an additional requirement that any claim of
emotional injury is insufficient absent evidence of physical injury. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e) (2000).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 23 28-JAN-09 7:35
2009] PROPORTIONALITY THEORY 75
to dismissal of numerous claims under the Eighth Amendment.89
If, for instance, the force used was in the form of pepper spray,
there is little doubt that a penal statute which authorized pepper
spray as a punishment for particular crimes would be declared un-
constitutional, whereas numerous courts have found that the use of
pepper spray on prisoners is a de minimis harm.90  Thus, although
the two prisoners have experienced exactly the same treatment,
under proportionality analysis a prisoner would have an arguably
better chance of having the punishment declared unconstitutional.
In part, this difference in the practical application of proportion-
ality and conditions analysis reflects deeper tensions in the concept
of deference at work in both contexts.  While the deference present
in proportionality litigation is profound when applied to sentences
of terms of years in prison, courts have shown less deference to
legislative judgments about the mode of punishment.91  By con-
trast, in conditions cases, which all concern different modes of pun-
ishment, judicial deference to agency expertise in managing prisons
is paramount, even as the actions deferred to begin to resemble
punishment rather than prison management.  In this sense, courts
may be too deferential because of the difficulty in policing the line
89. See Bailey v. Schmidt, 239 Fed. App’x 306, 308 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a rib
contusion and facial bleeding were de minimis); Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062,
1067 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding relatively minor scrapes and bruises and temporary ag-
gravation of shoulder problem were de minimis injuries); Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d
496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding a bruise that did not require medical treatment was a
de minimis injury); Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding pain,
swelling, and bruising to prisoner’s hand were de minimis injuries); Calabria v. Du-
bois, No. 93-1742, 1994 WL 209938, *2 (1st Cir. May 24, 1994) (holding that a radio
belt that was thrown at face of prisoner, drawing blood, was de minimis force); White
v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280-81 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that keys swung at prisoner
which slashed his ear was de minimis force); Jackson v. Pitcher, No. 92-1056, 1992 WL
133041, at *1 (6th Cir. June 16, 1992) (fing the stomping hand of prisoner was de
minimis force); Fuller v. Cocran, No. 1:05-CV-76, 2005 WL 1802415, at *3 (W.D.
Tenn. July 27, 2005) (finding pain from being choked and slightly bleeding wrists from
handcuffs were de minimis injuries); McMiller v. Wolf, No. 94-CV-0623E(F), 1995
WL 529620, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1995) (finding laceration of a prisoner’s finger a
with broken mirror was a de minimis force); DeArmas v. Jaycox, No. 92 Civ. 6139,
1993 WL 37501, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1993) (finding the punching of a prisoner in the
arm and kicking him in the leg was de minimis), aff’d, 14 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993);
Olson v. Coleman, 804 F. Supp. 148, 150 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding a single blow to the
head of a handcuffed prisoner was de minimis force).
90. See Hernandez v. Jones, No. 06 CV 3738 ARR, 2006 WL 3335091, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2006) (collecting cases); see also Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 Fed.
App’x 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Morgan, 19 Fed. App’x 97, 102 (4th Cir.
2001); Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 496-97 (8th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Marengo County
Jail, No. 07-0662-CG-C, 2008 WL 3852664, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2008); Hart v.
Celaya, 548 F. Supp. 2d 789, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
91. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text. R
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between prison conditions that reflect management principles and
prison conditions that are punitive in nature.  In Part III, I address
how proportionality principles might be applied in conditions liti-
gation to counterbalance this  excessive deference.
III. BRINGING PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS INTO CONDITIONS
OF CONFINEMENT LITIGATION
In what way could the lessons from proportionality be brought
into conditions of confinement litigation?  I can only begin to sug-
gest answers in this paper.  Part III begins with a discussion of
some of the general principles from proportionality analysis that
might be applied with beneficial effect to conditions litigation, and
then proceeds to discuss three specific examples.  I close by dis-
cussing some of the more obvious drawbacks to merging elements
of proportionality analysis with conditions jurisprudence.
A. The Broad Advantages of Proportionality Analysis
The most glaring difference between proportionality and condi-
tions jurisprudence is the relevance of prison officials’ state of
mind to establishing an Eighth Amendment violation.  In condi-
tions of confinement litigation, there is always a requirement that
the prisoner-plaintiff establish that prison officials acted with a suf-
ficiently culpable state of mind.92  In proportionality litigation, in
contrast, there is no consideration of the state of mind of the entity
imposing punishment—the only concern is whether the experience
of the prisoner fits the offense of conviction.  The state of mind
requirement in conditions litigation is often a difficult hurdle to
overcome.93  Thus, at least one benefit of reuniting proportionality
litigation with conditions of confinement analysis could be a re-
duced emphasis on subjective states of mind of prison officials.
92. The level of culpability required will depend on whether the prisoner alleges
that excessive force was used, medical care was not provided, or conditions like over-
crowding are present. See supra notes 57-58.  This aspect of conditions of confine- R
ment analysis has been subject to some criticism form the outset.  Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether the constitutional stan-
dard has been violated should turn on the character of the punishment rather than the
motivation of the individual who inflicted it.”).
93. Cf. Eva Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert:  Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 119, 146 (2007)
(“By refusing to examine prison conditions that do not derive from a particular offi-
cial’s deliberate or reckless indifference, the Court has effectively removed much of
prison life from Eighth Amendment protection.”).
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Looking to proportionality litigation might also refocus attention
on the ample deference that courts give to prison administrators to
make decisions that have a substantial impact on the living experi-
ence of confined prisoners.  In both proportionality and conditions
litigation, courts require substantial deference to the coordinate
political branches, but the justification for that deference is differ-
ent in significant ways.  In the context of prison conditions litiga-
tion, courts grant such deference because of the role of prison
administrators in exercising the judgment necessary “to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional secur-
ity.”94  In proportionality litigation, the deference is to legislative
judgment regarding the appropriateness of particular sentences.95
If the conditions experienced by prisoners are seen as “punish-
ment” in the same way as a sentence of a fixed period of imprison-
ment, however, then the question of deference becomes more
difficult.  Indeed, the popular conception of what legitimizes pun-
ishment, from a political theory perspective, is the majoritarian
process of law-making.96  It thus bears investigation into what legit-
imates the imposition of conditions of confinement which equate to
punishment.  On one theory, the legislature could be considered to
have delegated the authority to punish to prison officials.  But, de-
pending on one’s view of agency expertise and administrative law,
such delegation may have limitations, especially in light of the clear
delegation to the judiciary of the authority to impose a sentence
within the range prescribed by the legislature.97  Moreover, de-
94. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979); see also, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 351 n.16 (1981) (referring to “complex and intractable” problems of
prison administration which “are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree”).
95. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (referring to the “longstanding”
deference to “important policy decisions” regarding criminal sentencing); Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (“By affirming the District Court decision after our
decision in Rummel, the Court of Appeals sanctioned an intrusion into the basic line-
drawing process that is properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.”) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (“Given
the unique nature of the punishments considered in Weems and in the death penalty
cases, one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that
for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by
significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”). But see Baze v. Rees,
128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (referring to the fear that the Court might “substantially
intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their execution procedures”).
96. See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 312-13 (2004).
97. The judiciary’s role in entering a sentence against a criminal accused has a long
pedigree.  So long as a court acts within the statutory framework, it is free to exercise
its discretion based on facts and evidence particular to the defendant. See United
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pending on one’s theory of legitimate political process, the judici-
ary may be more or less justified in interfering with conditions of
confinement as a limitation on the State’s ability to impose inhu-
mane conditions of confinement.98  That is, while it might make
sense to defer to prison officials’ judgment about what conditions
are necessary to guarantee security and safety in prison, it may
make less sense to defer to prison administrators’ judgment about
what is appropriate “punishment” for a particular offender.  Teas-
ing out the appropriate amount of deference would require a more
expansive discussion of administrative law principles than there is
room for here, but there is at least the possibility that viewing con-
ditions as “punishment” in the proportionality sense would be sug-
gestive of a less deferential posture for state courts.99
Moreover, a focus on proportionality has the potential to
broaden the discussion about whether certain prison conditions are
beneficial to penological goals.100  If the conditions inquiry be-
comes part of the sentencing proceeding, there could be many
ramifications, including increased public attention regarding condi-
tions prevalent in prisons, the possible different postures that
judges may take in endorsing particular conditions ex ante rather
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a
judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.”);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (collecting cases supporting exercise
of judicial discretion in sentencing).  In New York State, by contrast, it is unclear
whether the Department of Corrections or its Commissioner can be said to have been
delegated the power to punish. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 112(2) (McKinney 2003) (cor-
rectional facilities are established for the purpose of “providing places of confinement
and programs of treatment for persons in the custody of the department” for the
“objective of assisting sentenced persons to live as law abiding citizens”); id. § 112(1)
(delegating to Commissioner the “superintendence, management and control of the
correctional facilities”); id. § 137(1) (directing the Commissioner to establish “pro-
gram and classification procedures” so that prisoners are assigned “to a program that
is most likely to be useful in assisting him to refrain from future violations of the
law”).
98. Dolovich, supra note 96, at 411-12.  Dolovich argues that the State is obliged R
to impose humane punishment, unless imposing inhumane punishment is necessary to
achieve relevant penological purpose. See id.  Even where an inhumane punishment
may be permitted, it may not be, “in either duration or form, more severe than neces-
sary” to achieve the desired result. Id.
99. Despite the fact that federal courts are perceived to be more and more con-
servative, prisoner advocates continue to be reluctant to rely upon state courts for
relief for familiar reasons such as concerns about procedural rules, comparative com-
petence, and the problem of relying on a popularly elected judiciary. See Sturm, Leg-
acy, supra note 74, at 732-33.  Reliance on principles developed in proportionality R
litigation may make advocates more open to pursuing relief in state courts.
100. See Haney, supra note 81, at 265 (criticizing the prison conditions debate for R
focusing on harm inflicted by prison conditions rather than whether any of them pro-
duce a benefit).
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than ex post, and the possibility of favorable comparisons to alter-
native sentencing regimes.  Relatedly, there is the possibility that
state courts would be more active in moderating prison conditions
if they approached them from the perspective of proportionality.
There have been some examples of “new Federalism” in the Eighth
Amendment proportionality context that could carry over if state
courts were asked to review conditions under a similar frame-
work.101  Indeed, in the nineteenth century, state courts were much
more active than federal courts in regulating the permissibility of
legislatively-mandated punishments.102
B. Three Specific Illustrations of the Potential Link Between
Proportionality and Conditions Litigation
What does it mean, practically, to integrate proportionality prin-
ciples into conditions litigation?  In Part III.B, I discuss three ex-
amples of varying levels of generality.  First, I discuss the possibility
that elements of proportionality analysis could be used to review
the permissibility of prison disciplinary measures.  Second, I show
how proportionality analysis might inform general conditions liti-
gation so as to call into question the emphasis on defendants’ state
of mind in conditions of confinement cases.  Finally, I discuss the
possibility that proportionality review might inform sentencing and
classification decisions and, in particular, examine the controversial
possibility that the permissibility of conditions of confinement
could depend on a particular prisoner’s crime of incarceration.
1. Proportionality and Disciplinary Measures
When prisoners commit infractions in prison, they are subject to
various kinds of discipline, the most serious of which is disciplinary
segregation, sometimes called “SHU” for “Special Housing Unit.”
SHU typically involves restrictive conditions of confinement, such
as being restricted to one’s cell for twenty-three hours a day, depri-
vation of human contact, solitary confinement, and reduced “privi-
leges.”103  Prisoners who are held in disciplinary segregation
generally can challenge their isolated confinement in two ways:  ei-
101. E.g., People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992) (holding that the statute
upheld in Harmelin violated Michigan’s “cruel or unusual” punishment clause); State
v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64 (Ariz. 2003) (holding a fifty-two year prison sentence for sexual
misconduct crimes was unconstitutional under state law).
102. See supra notes 23-26. R
103. See, e.g., Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 655 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing SHU
conditions in New York prisons).
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ther by claiming that the conditions in punitive segregation violate
the Eighth Amendment because they deprive prisoners of the min-
imum needs recognized by society,104 or by arguing that the proce-
dures by which they were placed in SHU did not provide sufficient
due process.105  The first category of challenge is rarely successful:
most courts are hesitant to find that even the most restrictive con-
ditions of confinement in SHU violate Eighth Amendment stan-
dards.106  The second kind of challenge does not implicate the
conditions or length of confinement in SHU, except insofar as the
nature and duration of SHU confinement is relevant to whether
the prisoner has been deprived of a liberty interest sufficient to
trigger due process protections.
Therefore, courts currently exercise minimal oversight over the
use of SHU confinement in prisons.  If the prison has provided suf-
ficient process, and the conditions on SHU are not extremely out-
rageous, prison administrators can sentence individuals to SHU
confinement of any length of time, provided it does not result in
their detention in prison after the expiration of their sentence.  In
this framework, prisoners are routinely sentenced to lengthy peri-
ods of time in SHU, sometimes stretching to decades, without any
ground for challenge by prisoner-plaintiff.107  Yet placement in soli-
tary confinement or SHU is common.  In 1989, forty percent of
104. A prisoner challenged the conditions of confinement in Wisconsin’s supermax
prison, see Jones ‘El v. Berge, No. 00-C-421-C, 2001 WL 34379611 (W.D. Wis. Aug.
14, 2001), resulting in a settlement in which the state agreed to take steps to improve
conditions and remove mentally ill prisoners from the prison.  Courts have generally
been more receptive of challenges to restrictive conditions of confinement brought on
behalf of mentally ill prisoners. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
105. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995).
106. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Supreme Court affirmed an order
by the district court restraining Arkansas from imposing solitary sentences of more
than thirty days, because of the detrimental conditions of confinement in isolation
cells. See id. at 682-83.  Because the Court was reviewing the lower court’s factual
findings under a deferential standard of review, however, Hutto does not stand for the
proposition that confinement in solitary for more than thirty days will always violate
the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 686.
107. The average confinement in SHU in New York is six and a half months, al-
though the number is much higher (thirty-eight months) for individuals with mental
illness. See Hearing on Special Housing Units Before the Corrections Comm. of the
New York State Assemb., 2003 Assemb. (N.Y. 2003) (testimony of Jennifer Wynn,
Director, Prison Visiting Project, Correctional Association of New York), http://www.
correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/pvp/testimony/2003_SHU_testi-
mony.pdf.  In addition, SHU sentences of many years are becoming increasingly com-
mon throughout the Nation’s prisons. See Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement
and International Human Rights:  Why the U.S. Prison System Fails Global Standards,
21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 76 & n.25 (2005).
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prisoners in maximum security prisons were being placed in soli-
tary confinement,108 and one can only expect that number to have
grown since then.
The lessons of proportionality could prove instructive here.
Rather than ask courts to condemn SHU conditions in absolute
terms under the Eighth Amendment, a difficult proposition, pris-
oner-plaintiffs could instead argue that the length of their SHU
sentence is disproportionate to their infraction.  Under traditional
conditions of confinement litigation, inquiry into disciplinary deci-
sions by prison administrators is off-limits, because of the defer-
ence owed to their judgment as to the penological needs.  On the
other hand, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence accepts the proposi-
tion that the lived experience of prisoners can be construed as
“punishment” under the Eighth Amendment, and SHU confine-
ment is itself treated as a form of punishment within prison walls.
Therefore, requiring some “fit” between the punishment and the
offense may be consistent with the judiciary’s role under the
Eighth Amendment.
If proportionality principles were brought to bear on lengthy
SHU detention, several new sources of authority may emerge as
relevant to the inquiry.  For instance, the fact that states have uni-
formly rejected the imposition of solitary confinement for crimes of
any kind, even for much shorter periods than are typically imposed
in prisons,109 could be relevant as to whether using solitary as a
form of punishment in prison is consistent with evolving standards
of decency.  If every state has rejected solitary confinement as a
means of punishment for violations of the penal code, then there is
a legitimate question as to whether it is permissible to use solitary
confinement to punish violations of prison regulations.  Moreover,
the empirical evidence that serious psychological harm from soli-
tary confinement has been observed after confinement of less than
108. Bryan B. Walton, The Eighth Amendment and Psychological Implications of
Solitary Confinement, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 285 (1997).
109. See Craig Haney & Monal Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future:  A Psycho-
logical Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 477, 481-87 (1997).  Such an argument would have to grapple with the notion
that the difference between living outside of prison and living inside prison is much
more significant than the difference between being in general population and being
confined in SHU. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 572 n.19 (1974) (distinguish-
ing between liberty interests at stake in the transition from freedom to general popu-
lation and from general population to SHU); see also Adam J. Kolber, The
Comparative Nature of Punishment (Sept. 10, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266158) (arguing that se-
verity of punishment should be measured according to a subjective baseline).
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thirty days raises questions as to the “fit” between the increasing
length of solitary confinement and the seriousness of the infrac-
tions justifying that confinement.110  For those prisoners who are
placed in solitary confinement, there are serious ramifications, such
as stress from sensory deprivation, psychosis, the inability to com-
municate, difficulty eating, and paranoid hallucinations.111  It
makes prisoners more violent and undisciplined.112  The experience
of prisoners held in supermax facilities is similar.113  In some cir-
cumstances, the placement of individuals in solitary confinement is
arguably disproportionate punishment.114  In those facilities where
gang members are placed in isolation, individual prisoners may ar-
gue that such treatment is disproportionate to their crime.115  Fi-
nally, international standards may inform the use of solitary
confinement as punishment, because international law almost uni-
formly condemns lengthy sentences in solitary confinement for
prisoners.116  Thus, in the particular case of the use of solitary or
SHU confinement, proportionality analysis could provide advo-
cates with more avenues for relief.
2. Revisiting Deference in Conditions of Confinement
Incorporating proportionality analysis into challenges to solitary
confinement or SHU is a focused approach to using proportionality
to make up for the limitations of current conditions of confinement
110. E.g., Nilsen, supra note 93, at 129 (noting that prisoners in solitary confine- R
ment experience increases in suicidal ideation and mental illness).
111. See Walton, supra note 108, at 277-80; see also Nan D. Miller, Comment, Inter- R
national Protection of the Rights of Prisoners:  Is Solitary Confinement in the United
States a Violation of International Standards?, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 139, 163 (1995)
(reviewing studies that indicate that solitary confinement alone, even in the absence
of physical brutality or other detrimental conditions, can cause emotional and psycho-
logical damage and interfere with rehabilitation); Christine Rebman, Comment, The
Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement:  The Gap in Protection from Psycho-
logical Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 581-84 (1999) (describing research
documenting the deleterious psychological impact of solitary confinement).
112. See Walton, supra note 108, at 281. R
113. See Nilsen, supra note 93, at 128 (noting that prisoners in supermax experience R
profound psychological isolation).
114. For instance, the Court has in the past considered the length of confinement in
solitary confinement to be relevant to determining whether such a condition violates
the Eighth Amendment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978).
115. See Nilsen, supra note 93, at 129 (noting some states use isolation units solely R
because of a prisoner’s status as a gang member).
116. See Miller, supra note 111, at 168.  There is also support in international law R
for recognizing the cruelty inherent in the “death row phenomenon,” in which con-
demned prisoners experience long delays on death row. See David Heffernan,
America the Cruel and Unusual?  An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under Inter-
national Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 481, 554-57 (1996).
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jurisprudence.  But elements of proportionality jurisprudence
could also influence how we approach conditions of confinement
litigation in general, and in particular could help resolve the ten-
sion between the meaning of “punishment” in proportionality and
conditions jurisprudence.  For instance, imagine a legislature that
passes a criminal statute that, along with announcing terms of im-
prisonment, also imposes the following conditions of confinement:
for those serving life sentences, one in five will be randomly se-
lected to be victims of a sexual assault;117
all prisoners will be forcibly administered medication that
causes increased blood pressure;118
some proportion of prisoners will be selected to be exposed to
infectious diseases like tuberculosis;119 and
all prisoners will be sprayed in the face with pepper spray once
every six months.120
This is, thankfully, a difficult statute to imagine being passed.  It
would appear obviously unconstitutional in that it, in the least, im-
poses cruel and unusual punishment.121  Yet there is also little seri-
117. It is estimated the 20% of prisoners serving life sentences will be sexually as-
saulted in prison. See Nilsen, supra note 93, at 125-26.  The sexual assault rates are R
difficult to quantify because of low self-reporting among some prisoners.  With sexual
assault comes, of course, trauma and the risk of sexually transmitted diseases.  Moreo-
ver, even those who are not assaulted experience fear and anxiety from the prospect
of assault.  Congress has responded to the reality of sexual assault in prison by pas-
sage of the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. See 42 U.S.C. §15601 (2000 & Supp.
III 2004).  This Act provides for information gathering more than anything else. See
id. §§ 15603-15604.
118. Overcrowding leads to increased blood pressure among prisoners, creates
debilitating physical and psychological stress, and leads to increased disciplinary viola-
tions.  Haney, supra note 81, at 271; see also Terence P. Thornberry & Jack E. Call, R
Constitutional Challenges to Prison Overcrowding:  The Scientific Evidence of Harm-
ful Effects, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 313, 332-36 (1983) (reviewing studies that, in general,
showed that a reduction in the number of square feet of living space per inmate corre-
sponded with a significant and substantial increase in both the number and rate of
disciplinary infractions, and also in assaults).
119. Thornberry & Call, supra note 118, at 337-39.  In general, overcrowding will R
lead to increased complaints of illness. Id. at 339-42.
120. A variation of this hypothetical was discussed supra Part II.B
121. The examples listed in the hypothetical statute are just a sampling of the harms
caused by prison conditions that are unfortunately prevalent in many states.   For
instance, overcrowding has serious consequences that go beyond the effects of spatial
limitations to impact medical and programming availability. See Haney, supra note
81, at 267.  It can make it difficult or impossible to screen or treat mentally ill prison- R
ers. See id. at 273.  It leads to increased idleness because of the lack of prison jobs,
which itself has harmful psychological and behavioral consequences. See id. at 274-75
(noting that less than twenty percent of the national prison population works).  Signif-
icant amounts of idle time can contribute to increased incidence of prison rape. See
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ous question that the existence of these same conditions alone,
experienced by some prisoners on a daily basis, would not be de-
clared unconstitutional when evaluated under traditional condi-
tions of confinement analysis.  In part, this is because of the state of
mind requirement in conditions of confinement jurisprudence, but
the state of mind requirement is intimately connected to the view
of “punishment” that is implicit in proportionality and conditions
litigation.  As discussed above, the intent to punish is presumed in
proportionality litigation (or else is not even required), whereas a
plaintiff must prove a particular state of mind with respect to the
punishment in conditions litigation.
This paradox also points to the difference between the deference
afforded prison officials and the deference afforded legislators.
Courts disavow both the ability and intention to question the ex-
pertise of prison officials in managing their facilities.  They also
recognize the separation of powers barrier to overly restrictive re-
view of legislative choices about appropriate punishments.  But as
the absurd hypothetical demonstrates, when reviewing legislative
versus prison administrators’ imposition of certain “punishments”,
arguably more deference is shown to prison administrators.
Thus, the different approaches to proportionality and conditions
of confinement litigation force us to question whether the defer-
ence afforded prison administration is grounded in appropriate
principles.  Is it possible that courts should defer to prison adminis-
trative choices that address the need to manage prisons, but not the
administrative choices relating to the need to punish?  Is it possible
to separate these two strands from each other?  If so, perhaps it is
less appropriate to defer to administrative choices about punish-
ment.  Perhaps it is not appropriate at all to defer to these choices.
If a turn toward proportionality will have an impact on condi-
tions of confinement, it may do so by convincing courts to
reimagine the ways in which the experience of prison can be con-
ceived of as punishment.122  Looking to proportionality analysis has
the potential to move courts towards a vision of punishment that
id. at 276. There is also evidence of an increased risk of death by suicide or violence
linked to high prison populations and overcrowding. See Thornberry & Call, supra
note 118, at 348-50. R
122. See James J. Park, Redefining Eighth Amendment Punishments: A New Stan-
dard for Determining the Liability of Prison Officials for Failing to Protect Inmates
from Serious Harm, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 407, 433-36 (2001) (positing that thinking
of treatment by prison officials as punishment is a break from traditional analytical
theory of punishment which focuses on a judge’s punishment through sentencing).
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takes into account the entire picture of prison life, collateral conse-
quences, and the like.123
3. Proportionality and Offender-Specific Conditions
of Confinement
Just as proportionality could help courts reimagine the deference
that is to be given to prison officials in conditions cases, it also
could help broaden the notion of punishment in conditions cases.
As the doctrines currently stand, proportionality jurisprudence reg-
ulates the connection between particular offenses and particular
sentences.  By definition, some sentences will be too harsh for
some crimes, but appropriate for other crimes.  Once a prisoner is
incarcerated, however, punishments, as experienced through prison
conditions, are all-or-nothing:  they are either consistent with mini-
mum standards of decency or not.
Proportionality jurisprudence offers another approach, although
it is admittedly controversial.  Take a typical challenge to over-
crowded conditions of confinement, such as Rhodes v. Chapman.124
In Rhodes, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff class had
failed to provide sufficient evidence that overcrowding and associ-
ated conditions resulted in objectively serious injuries, in the form
of increased violence in the prison or inadequate medical care or
nutrition.125  The argument made by the plaintiff class and contem-
plated by the Court rested on the proposition that the overcrowded
conditions were either constitutional or unconstitutional, for all
prisoners.  But proportionality analysis might suggest that the con-
ditions could be constitutionally imposed as punishment for some
classes of prisoners, but not constitutionally imposed on a different
class of prisoner, either because of their crime of incarceration or
particular characteristics.
There is some limited evidence that courts are willing to engage
in the proportionality analysis I suggest here.  For instance, in chal-
lenges to conditions of confinement in supermax prisons, courts
have found that for certain subsets of populations—mentally ill
prisoners—conditions of confinement can rise to the level of an
123. Nilsen, supra note 93, at 142 (identifying the problem with Eighth Amendment R
jurisprudence after Weems, Trop, and Estelle to be that “a challenged punishment will
never be considered holistically.  Instead, the Court will divide it up into parts, each to
be analyzed separately without regard to the punishment’s cumulative, spirit-crushing
impact”).
124. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
125. See id. at 348-49.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 34 28-JAN-09 7:35
86 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI
Eighth Amendment violation.126  This is consistent with that strand
of proportionality analysis in the capital punishment area that has
found the death penalty to be an unconstitutional punishment for
particular categories of defendants, such as those who are mentally
retarded or those who committed their crimes under the age of
eighteen.127  If particular conditions of confinement are first chal-
lenged as unconstitutional as applied to particular categories of
prisoner, it may begin bridging the gap between proportionality
and conditions litigation.  For instance, mentally ill detainees may
argue that segregation in prison is inevitable because of difficulty
complying with prison rules, leading to exacerbation of some
mental illness, and requiring a modification of disciplinary rules
that takes account of mental illness and perhaps even a limitation
on the ability to imprison the mentally ill in the first place.128
CONCLUSION
There are many barriers to importing proportionality analysis
into conditions jurisprudence.  To begin with, some headway will
have to be made against the “death is different” doctrine that limits
judicial review of noncapital sentences for proportionality.129
Moreover, as the Supreme Court’s analysis suggests, proportional-
ity in the prison context is quite limited, perhaps even more so than
proportionality in the punitive damages context.130
Perhaps more troubling, there is a double-edged aspect of im-
porting proportionality theories into conditions litigation.  Differ-
entiating among different kinds of offenders in terms of the kinds
of conditions that might be permissible could wreak havoc in the
administration of prisons, and also could be pernicious in sug-
126. See Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial Deference
and the Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505 (2004) (discussing
opinions in Jones ‘El v. Berge, No. 00-C-421-C, 2001 WL 34379611 (W.D. Wis. Aug.
14, 2001), Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999), and Madrid v. Gomez,
889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
127. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for
those who committed crimes under the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for the mentally retarded).
128. See Nilsen, supra note 93, at 131-32. R
129. See id. at 152-53.
130. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportion-
ality Jurisprudence:  Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments
and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1290-91 (2000).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 35 28-JAN-09 7:35
2009] PROPORTIONALITY THEORY 87
gesting that the “worst” prisoners could be subject to the worst
conditions of confinement.131
Nonetheless, proportionality jurisprudence has something to of-
fer conditions of confinement litigation.  In particular, a close look
at the links between the two doctrines can help expose some of the
more difficult barriers to court supervision of prison conditions of
confinement.  Should courts continue to defer to prison administra-
tors in areas of “punishment,” in the absence of a clear delegation
of the authority to punish by the legislature?  Should courts con-
tinue to impose high standards of subjective liability for prisoners
who seek to establish the unconstitutionality of certain prison con-
ditions?  This paper suggests that there are some reasons, grounded
in proportionality doctrine, to consider the answers to these ques-
tions contestable.
131. Cf. Weidman, supra note 126, at 1542 (discussing the danger of Eighth R
Amendment jurisprudence which suggests that more restrictive conditions of confine-
ment could be permissible for “more resilient inmates”); see also Haney & Lynch,
supra note 109, at 557 (“[T]his extraordinary threshold of cognizable Eighth Amend- R
ment psychic pain, limited to those things that create a high risk that everyone ex-
posed to them will become seriously mentally ill, could legitimize virtually any form
of degrading, inhumane, and psychologically abusive treatment in prison, no matter
how extreme and otherwise harmful.”).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 36 28-JAN-09 7:35
